Estimations on the security aspect of Brands' electronic cash scheme by Chang, Yu Cheng et al.
    Estimations on the Security Aspect of Brand’s Electronic Cash Scheme 
Chang Yu Cheng*, Jasmy Yunus*, and Kamaruzzaman Seman** 
*Faculty of Electrical Engineering, 
      Universiti Teknologi Malaysia, 
      81300 Skudai, Johor, Malaysia. 
              E-Mails: cyu_cheng@bip.utm.my, jasmy@bip.utm.my
    **Telekom R&D, 
    UPM-MTDC Incubation Center, 
    Lebuh Silikon, 
    Universiti Putra Malaysia, 
    43409 Serdang, 
    Selangor, Malaysia. 
 E-Mail: drkzaman@rndtm.net.myE-mail
Abstract
In Crypto’93, Stefan Brands [1] proposed a very 
efficient off-line electronic cash. Then, the subsequent 
researchers such as Ernest Foo [2,3], WK Yip [4] and 
Yiannis [5] developed their schemes based upon 
Brands model [1] to improve Brand’s efficiency. In 
this paper, we demonstrate the feasibility of attacks on 
Brands scheme’s security aspect. By our attacks 
presented here, we conclude the security aspect of  
[1,2,3,4,5] has been defeated by us. Although we 
address here that Brand’s security aspect need to be 
further investigated, but the anonymous feature in 
Brand’s scheme [1] remain significant contributions to 
electronic cash, especially for privacy reason. 
Keywords: Electronic Payment Systems, 
Cryptography, Network Security, Electronic Cash, 
Brands model. 
1. Introduction 
In Crypto’93, Brands presented a very efficient off-
line electronic cash scheme based on the representation 
problem in groups of prime order [1]. Subsequently, 
the efficiency of [1] is improved further by Ernest Foo 
[2,3], WK Yip [4] and Yiannis [5], with the 
underneath security of their schemes remain as [1]. In 
this paper, we discover flaws of [1], that are applicable 
also to [2,3,4,5]. We however, have also perform fix 
on the security of Brands [1] in our another paper at 
[6]. Hence, we believe that the original contributions 
of Brands in [1] and in [2,3,4,5] are strong and 
represent important electronic cash systems to be 
further studied and improved.   
Our counterfeit attacks in this paper include 
sequential attacks and parallel attack. Sequential attack
is that attack that the attacker interacts sequentially 
with the signer. While Parallel Attack is the attack 
which the attacker can initiate several interactions at 
the same time with the signer in any order she wants. 
Our attacks enable the attacker(s) to spend their 
withdrawn coin more than once, without being 
detected. This is done in such a way that the User, U
can mint the coin parameters satisfy the verification 
equations of the coin signature, even if she does not 
know the Bank’s private key.  
Organization: The purpose of this paper is to 
investigate on the security aspect of [1]. In Section 2, 
we will estimate on the security of [1] and discuss our 
attacks on [1]. We then conclude this paper in Section 
3.
2. Security estimations and attacks on 
Brands scheme 
In this section, we show how the fraudulent user 
can successfully perform various counterfeit attacks on 
Brands scheme [1]. The details descriptions of Brands 
scheme kindly refer to [1]. We exploit the weakness of 
the security aspect of Brands [1] by performing 
sequential and parallel attacks. The fix of these attacks 
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over Brands scheme is further discussed in our paper at 
[6].  
2.1. Counterfeit Attacks 
Proposition 1. Fraudulent users can counterfeit/forge 
a coin in Brand’s wallet with observer model. Any 
schemes based upon the security of Brand’s model are 
vulnerable to this form of attacks.  
Proof:
[Attack 1]
The attack here is to reinvent the user part of the 
payment protocol, in such a way that the user does not 
require carrying out the related withdrawal protocol. 
This means the user can mint the coin by herself and 
spend such coin at Shop, S. With such modified 
fraudulent payment protocol in Brand’s model, anyone 
can forge the coin, because User, U can make the coin 
parameters satisfy the verification equations, even if 
she does not know B’s private key. 
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Note that, if user double spent in deposit, the 
information the Bank, B have is the pair (r1, r2, d) and 
(r1*, r2*, d*). Thus the Bank, B tries to compute the 
user’s identity, as below:          
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However, this is not user’s identity. Thus, the User, U
can double spend without her real identity being 
revealed. Bank, B cannot determine the double spender 
even if she spends the forged coins multiple times. 
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Figure 1: Attack 1: Withdrawal protocol of attacked  
Brand’s model 
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[Attack 2] 
This attack is another type of parallel attack. In this 
parallel attack, two users join force to compute a coin. 
This computed coin does not go through withdrawal 
protocol. Firstly, each of the two users withdraws a 
coin. Then, they compute and fake the third coin by 
themselves using such withdrawn information. When 
the user uses that third coin, the Bank cannot trace 
double spender. This indicates that, this third coin is in 
fact a valid coin/extra coin, generated by the user. We 
provide the following proof for the attack. 
Based on the Brand’s model, let  
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This means that, the two users, which each perform 
a withdrawal protocol, can use the information get 
from withdrawal protocol to fake another extra coin, 
and spend it without being identified. Figure 3 shows 
the withdrawal protocol of the Attack 2 on Brand’s 
model. 
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Thus, the fraudulent user’s identity cannot be traced, 
when the fraudulent user performs double spending. 
[Attack 3] 
Here, we show that Brand’s model is vulnerable to 
so-called “parallel attacks”, in which two users 
perform their withdrawals in parallel, and then frame 
up a coin with cooperation. This attack enables two 
users to obtain a coin that contain neither of their 
identities. They are able to spend more than once using 
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such counterfeit coin. The magic in this attack is to 
find suitable value of ? , uA, uB, sA, sB, wA, wB in order 
the user can spend the fake coin multiple times. Now, 
we suppose that two users UA and UB perform the 
withdrawal scheme in parallel. Note that, each user is 
using their withdrawal information separately. First, 
the user UA and UB sends cA and cB to Bank, B. The B
sends back rA and rB to UA and UB separately. These 
two users compute: qccc BA mod''' ?? ? (where
quccqcuc BBAA mod2',mod2' ?? ? ), ),( BAaaa
??
qrrr BA mod?? ? .
Let   ii
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This attack is done, as the user calculates the value of 
? .Thus, Brand’s model is vulnerable to all our 
attacks. This proof is complete.   ?
3. Conclusions 
This paper’s objective is to identify the security 
flaw exist in Brand’s scheme [1]. Such “breaking” also 
apply to [2,3,4,5] schemes, as they are based upon [1]. 
We have also performed fix on these attacks in [6], 
thus enabling further usage of [1,2,3,4,5] if some 
modifications based on our fix in [6] is performed. 
Thus, we believe that the original contributions in 
[1,2,3,4,5] are strong and important too. 
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